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INTRODUCTION
Recent school shootings, such as those in Santa Fe, Texas, and
Parkland, Florida, have intensified the long-standing national debate
surrounding gun policy.1 The debate centers around what one side
* © 2018 Aaron D. Davison.
1. See, e.g., Callum Borchers, Texas Shooting Suspect’s Choice of Guns Complicates
Debate over Assault Rifles, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/nationworld/ct-texas-school-shooting-gun-debate-20180520-story.html
[https://perma.cc/B5DE-2K7S (staff-uploaded archive)] (quoting an opponent of gun
control measures who believes that the shotgun used by the Santa Fe High School shooter
“is actually more deadly than the much-vilified AR-15” and that “[b]anning AR-15s will
do nothing to stop disturbed and deranged shooters”); Emily Witt, How the Survivors of
Parkland Began the Never Again Movement, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-survivors-of-parkland-began-the-neveragain-movement [http://perma.cc/KRS8-CAJ5] (explaining that only four days after the
shooting in Parkland, Florida, students began advocating for stricter background checks
through news interviews, op-eds, and the formation of the Never Again movement).
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sees as a necessary remedy to unacceptable gun violence across the
country and the other side perceives as the categorical abridgment
and eventual confiscation of a fundamental constitutional right.2
Commentators have criticized both viewpoints3 as being
counterproductive due to their ardent, all-or-nothing arguments.4 If
continued, one commentator argues, it will impede future attempts to
attain bipartisan compromise for gun policy.5
Despite the ideological gridlock, our nation’s gun laws have
changed substantially in the last fifty years. All fifty states now permit
concealed carry6 and forty-five states allow open carry of a gun,
though some are more restrictive than others.7 Of the forty-five states
2. Eric Arnesen, ‘Gunfight: The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms in America’ by
Adam Winkler, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 3, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/books/ctbooks-gunfight-review-story.html [https://perma.cc/JZ42-TGB2 (staff-uploaded archive)].
3. Justin Bank, Right and Left React to the Las Vegas Shooting and the Gun Control
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/us/politics/rightand-left-las-vegas-shooting-gun-control-debate.html [https://perma.cc/66Y4-9X22 (dark
archive)] (chronicling the debate following the Las Vegas shooting); James Brooke,
Shootings Firm Up Gun Control Cause, at Least for Present, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at
A1 (chronicling the debate following the Columbine shooting); Mariano Castillo, NRA
Clear on Gun Debate Stance: Arm Schools, CNN (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/
2012/12/21/us/connecticut-school-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZK4J-CJBA]
(chronicling the debate following the Sandy Hook shooting); Anna Dubenko, Right and
Left React to the Gun Control Debate After the Florida Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/politics/right-and-left-react-to-the-gun-controldebate-after-the-florida-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/6D7W-A2GW (dark archive)]
(chronicling the debate following the Parkland shooting); Michael D. Regan, San
Bernardino Shooting Sparks Fresh Debate Over Gun Laws, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 5,
2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/san-bernardino-shooting-sparks-fresh-debate-overgun-laws [https://perma.cc/8UDA-6YZ7] (chronicling the debate following the San
Bernardino shooting); Laurel Wamsley, A Texas Town Mourns, and a Nation Struggles to
Find New Ground in Gun Debate, NPR (May 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2018/05/21/613006381/a-texas-town-mourns-and-a-nation-struggles-to-find-newground-in-gun-debate [https://perma.cc/TLR9-S935 (dark archive)] (chronicling the debate
following a shooting in Santa Fe, New Mexico).
4. Arnesen, supra note 2.
5. See id.
6. Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/#state
[https://perma.cc/PSE7-UFNJ].
7. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 17
(2015) (discussing the proliferation of concealed carry permits in Florida and the nation at
large); Joshua Gillin, There Are 45 States that Allow Open Carry for Firearms, Former
NRA President Says, POLITIFACT FLA. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.politifact.com/
florida/statements/2015/nov/18/marion-hammer/there-are-45-states-allow-open-carry-handgunsform/ [https://perma.cc/9E6X-GQUX] (analyzing the NRA president’s statement regarding
open carry laws across the United States and concluding that groups on both sides of the
aisle on gun policy agree that five states ban open carry, although the open carry laws in
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that allow open carry, thirty-one allow it without a permit or license.8
Moreover, by 2010, District of Columbia v. Heller9 and McDonald v.
City of Chicago10 had fundamentally changed the scope of Second
Amendment rights.11 While the impetus behind this change is unclear,
one thing is evident: there has been an underlying evolution in the
way our nation views guns, which has impacted the pervasiveness of
concealed and open carry laws and the development of Supreme
Court jurisprudence.12
What many Americans fail to recognize is that this change is
more than simply a benefit or detriment to either side’s view of the
national gun debate.13 Specifically, this change turns the foundation of

some states are not as permissive as others). In fact, Professor Bellin also notes that
“almost every state enacted at least one new gun law” after the Sandy Hook shooting, but,
surprisingly, most of the new laws expanded gun rights. Bellin, supra, at 3.
8. Open Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/open-carry/ [https://perma.cc/
4U6W-CP8K]; see also Neena Satija, Texas a Flashpoint in National Debate over Right to
Film Police, TEX. TRIB. (May 9, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/09/reveal-story1/ [https://perma.cc/H462-9A4Y] (describing groups that seek to hold police accountable,
specifically highlighting members of a North Texas group called “Open Carry Cop Watch”
that brings cameras and legally carries AK-47 and AR-15 rifles when monitoring the
police).
9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
10. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
11. See id. at 791 (furthering the scope of Heller by concluding that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense applies to the states by incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment); Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that the Second
Amendment protects the right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and that the
respective statute in the District of Columbia was unconstitutional in banning the
possession of handguns in the home).
12. See Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court Has Strengthened Gun Rights and Limited
Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/06/
15/can-gun-control-still-pass-muster-in-the-supreme-court/the-supreme-court-has-strengthenedgun-rights-and-limited-gun-control [https://perma.cc/6VWJ-5S78] (identifying Hillary Clinton
and then-Senator Barack Obama as politicians who acknowledged the power of the
Second Amendment and the rights it confers to individuals); see supra notes 6–11 and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson (Robinson II), 846 F.3d 694, 707 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“Today in West Virginia, citizens are legally
entitled to arm themselves in public and there is no reason to think that a person carrying
or concealing a weapon during a traffic stop—conduct fully sanctioned by state law—is
anything but a law-abiding citizen who poses no threat to the authorities.”), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.); Bellin, supra note 7, at 2–6 (discussing the substantial
transformation of the nation’s gun laws and how this transformation changes the
underpinnings of gun policing, specifically through the Fourth Amendment); Matthew J.
Wilkins, Note, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of Firearms in Terry
Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1165–67 (2017) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
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stop-and-frisk tactics on its head.14 As the police and the courts are
faced with changing norms and sentiments surrounding guns, strict
adherence to rigid, antiquated rules—whether perceived or actual—
results in perverse outcomes. Indeed, this was the issue in United
States v. Robinson.15
In Robinson II,16 the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme
Court’s use of “armed and thus dangerous” to create a unitary
concept because “[t]he use of ‘and thus’ recognizes that the risk of
danger is created simply because the person, who was forcibly
stopped, is armed.”17 In other words, law enforcement need not
identify how an individual is dangerous outside of simply carrying a
weapon18: under the “‘thus’ iteration,” the weapon alone makes the
individual dangerous.
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted this
standard and effectively dismantled the basis of Terry frisks.
Permissive carry laws are ubiquitous, and many law-abiding citizens
freely participate.19 Now more than ever, the Fourth Circuit should
have held that the “armed and dangerous” standard is comprised of
two distinct inquiries that each require police to identify specific and
articulable facts before frisking an individual. The Fourth Circuit’s
unitary concept categorically disregards the evolution of
constitutional rights, permissive gun-related state laws, and, most
importantly, stop-and-frisk precedent, thereby subjecting both lawful
gun carriers and those merely suspected of being armed to unbridled
police discretion to stop-and-frisk.20

Second Amendment jurisprudence and the deregulation of state firearm laws have
“profoundly affected Fourth Amendment law,” specifically stop-and-frisk).
14. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining that “for many
years” law enforcement could rightfully “assume that anyone carrying a concealed firearm
was up to no good,” and, in fact, the act of carrying a concealed gun was branded as a
“hallmark[] of criminal activity”); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1167 (explaining that “[i]n the
past, there was a ‘blanket assumption’ that those who carried firearms were dangerous,”
but this consensus has somewhat faded).
15. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.);
see id. at 702 (Wynn, J., concurring).
16. Throughout this Comment, Robinson II refers to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ en banc decision, not to the 2016 decision that vacated Robinson’s conviction.
17. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 700 (first citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968); and
then citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (per curiam)).
18. See id. (“[T]he risk of danger is created simply because the person, who was
forcibly stopped, is armed.”).
19. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Sections II.A–II.B.1.
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Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the inception
of stop-and-frisk and explains the procedural history, facts, and
reasoning behind the majority and concurring opinions in Robinson
II. Part II analyzes how the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the armed
and dangerous standard and dismantled the basis of Terry frisks. It
then discusses how the inevitable implications of the unitary concept
will adversely affect lawful gun carriers and those assumed to be
armed. Part III concludes that the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari in a stop-and-frisk case, overturn the Fourth Circuit’s
unitary concept holding, and clarify the importance of a separate
showing of dangerousness in the frisk standard.
I. FROM TERRY TO ROBINSON
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from
engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures “but upon probable
cause.”21 Stop-and-frisk is a revolutionary concept in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence because it “cracked” the monolith of the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard.22 In Terry v. Ohio,23
the Supreme Court held that a police officer can stop and frisk an
individual based upon reasonable suspicion.24 One of the primary
justifications for adjudicating the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk
was the need for law enforcement to pursue investigations without
fear of assault by an armed individual.25
Like any new concept or practice, the Court set limiting
parameters and standards: (1) an officer may conduct a stop only if
they have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; and
(2) after conducting a stop, the officer may conduct a frisk of the
stopped individual only if there are specific and articulable facts that
show the person is armed and dangerous.26 Additionally, the Court
limited the scope of the frisk to a search for weapons in an
individual’s outer layer of clothing.27 While the stop-and-frisk

21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PERSPECTIVES 388–89 (6th ed. 2017).
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. Id. at 27, 30–31.
25. Id. at 29; Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.).
26. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009).
27. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31.
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doctrine has its proponents and detractors,28 it is an established arm
of the Fourth Amendment.29 The Supreme Court’s limiting standards
still stand to this day, but the frisk standard—more precisely, the
internal “dangerous” inquiry—is under attack.
In 2017, the majority in Robinson II held that “armed and
dangerous” is a unitary concept, thereby broadening the divide in the
already existing circuit split. This Part sets forth the facts and
procedural history of Robinson II, presents the reasoning of the
majority opinion, and summarizes the concurring opinion. The dissent
is analyzed at length in Parts II and III.
A. Facts and Procedural History
On March 24, 2014, in Ranson, West Virginia, an unidentified
caller alerted the police that he “witnessed a black male in a bluish
greenish Toyota Camry load a firearm [and] conceal it in his pocket”
at a 7-Eleven convenience store.30 According to the testimony of
several officers, the 7-Eleven is located in a quintessential high-crime
area.31 Once the responding officer observed a blue-green Toyota
Camry with a black, male passenger driving away from the 7-Eleven,
he stopped the vehicle on the basis that both occupants were not
wearing their seatbelts.32
After approaching the car and asking for identification, the
officer asked Shaquille Robinson to step out of the car.33 As
Robinson exited the car, the officer “asked if [Robinson] had any
weapons on him.”34 According to the questioning officer, Robinson
28. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957 (1999) (arguing that Terry v. Ohio was the
catalyst for curbing Fourth Amendment protections for racially motivated searches and
seizures); David A. Graham, Stop-and-Frisk: Trump’s Bad Idea for Fighting Crime,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-stopand-frisk-ineffective-unconstitutional/501041/ [https://perma.cc/5P6H-3L2K]; Thomas A.
Reppetto, Opinion, How Stop-and-Frisk Saved New York, N.Y. POST (July 24, 2012),
https://nypost.com/2012/07/24/how-stop-and-frisk-saved-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/Q2CZ-A6W5].
29. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26–27.
30. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 696.
31. One officer, with only a year and a half of law enforcement experience, stated that
he had experienced at least twenty drug trafficking incidents at this location. Id. Another
observed three people waiting for drugs while she was dropping off an informant to buy
drugs and received numerous complaints about drug transactions at this location. Id.
Lastly, “[a]nother officer testified that ‘anytime you hear Apple Tree or 7-Eleven, your
radar goes up a notch.’” See id. (alteration in original).
32. Id. at 697.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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said nothing but gave “a weird . . . ‘oh, crap’ look[].”35 The officer
understood this look to mean, “I don’t want to lie to you, but I’m not
going to tell you anything [either].”36 Thereafter, Robinson was
instructed to submit to a frisk in which the officer recovered a loaded
gun from his front pocket, confirming the prior tip.37 “According to
officers’ testimony, Robinson was cooperative . . . and made no
furtive gestures or movements” that suggested that he was reaching
for the weapon during the stop.38 As a previously convicted felon,
Robinson was charged with illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.39
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant
Robinson’s motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition seized
during the frisk as a Fourth Amendment violation based on
insufficient evidence that he was both armed and also dangerous.40
However, the motion was ultimately denied by the district court.41 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision,
vacating Robinson’s conviction and sentence.42 Almost two months
after the court reversed Robinson’s conviction, however, the court
granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc, thereby
vacating the previous panel’s judgment and opinion.43
B.

Majority Opinion

After addressing Robinson’s concessions,44 the majority focused
on the crux of the appeal—how the court would interpret and apply
the armed and dangerous inquiry.45 Robinson argued that although
35. Id. (alteration in original).
36. Id. (alteration in original).
37. Id.
38. United States v. Robinson (Robinson I), 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en
banc, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
40. Robinson I, 814 F.3d at 205 (emphasis added).
41. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 697. The district court “concluded that the . . . caller’s
eyewitness knowledge and the contemporaneous nature of the [call]” were sufficient to
“contribute to the officer’s reasonable suspicion” that Robinson was armed and dangerous
when taken together with the high-crime area and Robinson’s “weird look.” Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Judge Niemeyer, at the outset of his discussion, quickly addressed multiple
concessions that Robinson made in his briefs and oral argument, which included: (1) the
lawfulness of both the forced stop based on the seatbelt violations and the instruction to
exit the car; (2) the caller’s tip was sufficiently reliable to support the officer’s actions; and
(3) the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that Robinson was armed. See
id. at 697–98.
45. See id. at 698–702.
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the armed element of the standard was clearly met, the police are
required to identify independent, objective facts that indicate that he
is also dangerous.46 In other words, armed and dangerous
encompasses two distinct inquires, requiring that police point to
specific and articulable facts for each element before frisking an
individual.47 Robinson argued that West Virginia, through legislation,
allows its residents to carry concealed firearms.48 Therefore, the
caller’s tip that a man had a loaded and concealed weapon should
have been a mere alert to “innocent behavior,” given the officer’s
lack of knowledge as to whether Robinson possessed a license to
carry.49 Further, Robinson highlighted that his behavior during the
stop did not create a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness.50
The Fourth Circuit rejected Robinson’s arguments.51 Based on
the majority’s reading, Terry and its progeny hold that being armed
satisfies the armed and thus dangerous standard, allowing an officer
to lawfully frisk.52 Notwithstanding the term’s conjunctive form, the
inclusion of the word “thus” deliberately linked “armed” and
“dangerous” into a unitary concept.53 In support of this interpretation,
the court pointed to “the general risk . . . inherent during . . . traffic
stop[s],” as acknowledged by the Supreme Court.54 Coupling the
general risk in traffic stops with an individual who is “‘armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against’ the
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id.
48. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-4(a) (Westlaw through 2018 First Extraordinary
Sess.).
49. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698. It is important to note that the specific and
articulable facts that are used to obtain a reasonable belief of dangerousness can only
come from what the officer knows at the time before the frisk occurs. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). Uncertainty as to whether Robinson lawfully possessed the gun in
this concealed carry state supports Robinson’s argument that the officer lacked the
foundation to lawfully frisk him. See United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir.
2013) (discussing the “eviscerat[ion]” of the Fourth Amendment if possessing a firearm in
an open carry state as the sole justification for an investigatory detention).
50. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698 (“[H]e was compliant, cooperative, [and] not
displaying signs of nervousness.”); Robinson I, 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016)
(highlighting that the arresting officers indicated that Robinson was cooperative and made
no movements that might have suggested that he intended to reach for his weapon during
the stop), rev’d en banc, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017)
(mem.).
51. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698.
52. Id. at 699–700 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28).
53. Id. at 700.
54. Id. at 699; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
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officer,”55 a responding “officer is ‘warranted in believing his safety
. . . [is] in danger.’”56 Moreover, state law permitting open or
concealed carry does not eliminate danger to the officer in a lawful
stop.57 The court noted that the purpose of a frisk for weapons is not
to find evidence of a crime but to allow the officer to investigate the
grounds for the stop “without fear of violence.”58 Lawfully carried
weapons present no less of a danger than ones that are unlawfully
carried, especially when the individual’s propensities are unknown.59
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the frisk was
constitutional and affirmed the judgment of the district court.60
C.

Concurring Opinion

In his concurring opinion, Judge Wynn agreed at the outset that
Robinson’s concessions—that he was lawfully stopped and that the
police reasonably suspected he was carrying a firearm—alone were
enough for the police to lawfully conduct a frisk.61 He departed from
the majority, however, in the means used to reach that conclusion.62
Judge Wynn noted that the majority reduced the central inquiry to
whether the frisk was justifiable based solely on the tip that he carried
a loaded and concealed weapon.63 But this fails to address two crucial
questions: “(1) whether individuals who carry firearms—lawfully or
unlawfully—pose a categorical risk of danger to others and police
officers, in particular, and (2) whether individuals who choose to
carry firearms forego certain constitutional protections afforded to
individuals who elect not to carry firearms.”64 The answer to both
questions, Judge Wynn concluded, is yes.65
Beginning with the first question, Judge Wynn disagreed that the
armed and dangerous standard is unitary.66 First, from a purely
grammatical standpoint, the use of the word “and” by the Supreme
Court elicits the “long-standing principle that elements separated by a
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 699 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23).
Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
See id. at 700–01.
Id. at 701 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
Id.
Id. at 701–02.
Id. at 702 (Wynn, J., concurring).
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 703.
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conjunctive should be interpreted as distinct requirements.”67 In fact,
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits found this grammatical analysis
persuasive when holding that the armed and dangerous standard
encompasses two distinct elements.68
Second, interpreting the standard as unitary will lead to adverse
consequences for people merely engaged in harmless behavior.69 The
definition of armed, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is
“[e]quipped with a weapon.”70 Unlike the term “firearm,” “weapon”
can be broadly interpreted. Indeed, Justice Brennan addressed the
expansive definition of “weapon” by listing everyday objects that,
although dangerous when used for a nefarious purpose, should not
elicit reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk.71 Nevertheless, the
unitary concept interpretation means that any item that fits the
definition of a weapon can give rise to reasonable suspicion to
conduct a frisk, even if the item is not being used as a weapon.72
Third, Judge Wynn pointed out that the Supreme Court in
Michigan v. Long73 expressly recognized “the independent role of
‘dangerous[ness].’”74 But Judge Wynn’s argument did not overcome
the “thus” iteration; instead, it actually begged the question of how to
reconcile Long with the unitary concept.75
Notwithstanding the three arguments above, Judge Wynn argued
that his disagreement with the majority was not predicated on the
unitary concept interpretation in and of itself but, more distinctly, on
the contention that the standard is unitary for all weapons.76 Instead,

67. Id.
68. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Clearly established law require[s] . . . evidence that Northrup may have been ‘armed and
dangerous.’” (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1967))); United States v. Leo,
792 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that a frisk, which is an exception to a warrantless
search, is allowed when there is an “articulable suspicion” that the individual is “both
armed and a danger”).
69. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 703 (Wynn, J., concurring).
70. Id. (quoting Armed, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
71. See Wright v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1149 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(listing items that the legislature could not have contemplated as falling within the
definition of a weapon (quoting State v. Lee, 457 A.2d 1184, 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982) (Antell, J., dissenting), aff’d as modified, 475 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1984)).
72. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring).
73. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
74. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring) (citing Long, 463 U.S. at
1049).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 704–05.
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Terry and Pennsylvania v. Mimms77 conflated the standard only
where “officers reasonably suspect[] that a detainee has a firearm or
other inherently dangerous weapon.”78 From this premise, Judge
Wynn highlighted that the Supreme Court, and the Second, Fourth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have previously accorded heightened
attention to guns because of their inherent dangerousness.79 These
prior decisions led Judge Wynn to conclude that firearms are
inherently dangerous, and that those who carry them pose a risk of
danger to law enforcement and the public.80
This conclusion, however, begged the secondary question of
whether those who choose to carry firearms forego other
constitutional protections afforded to those who do not carry
firearms.81 The answer, again, was yes.82 The inherent danger of
choosing to carry a weapon necessarily impacts their exercise of other
constitutional rights, the most germane of which is being frisked when
lawfully stopped.83
II. HOW THE MAJORITY OPINION MISINTERPRETED THE ARMED
AND DANGEROUS STANDARD AND OPENED THE DOOR TO
PERVERSE IMPLICATIONS
The crux of the majority’s decision falls on whether Robinson
and the circumstances surrounding his arrest provided the officer with
specific and articulable facts as to his dangerousness. As mentioned
above, the majority held that the armed and dangerous standard is a
unitary concept based on the Supreme Court’s inclusion of the word

77. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
78. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring).
79. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (discussing a
law that mandated owners of legal firearms to disassemble or trigger lock their weapon);
McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986) (stating that a gun is “typically and
characteristically dangerous”); United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir.
2007) (stating that a loaded gun is “by any measure an inherently dangerous weapon”);
Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the possession of a
firearm increases the risk of danger by adding “an aspect of violence to otherwise
nonviolent conduct”); Love v. Tippy, 133 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the
threat to the safety of others that firearms pose due to their “inherently violent nature”);
United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1997) (contrasting the regulation of
financial structuring with the regulation of firearms which “are inherently dangerous
devices”).
80. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 705 (Wynn, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 706.
82. See id.
83. Id.
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“thus” in Terry and Mimms. Therefore, the officer was justified in
conducting a frisk based solely on the reasonable belief that Robinson
was armed.84 The concurrence admonished the majority’s holding as it
pertained to its overbroad reach in applying to all weapons.85 Judge
Wynn found the unitary concept acceptable only in its application to
firearms.86 Despite the slight difference, the unitary concept, as
articulated by both the majority and concurrence, is an
unconstitutional and incorrect reading of Terry and its progeny. The
Supreme Court created the armed and dangerous standard to
encompass two distinct inquiries. By reading the “armed and thus
dangerous” iterations in isolation, the majority misinterpreted the
standard.
A. Errors by the Majority
In Terry, a police officer observed two men alternately walk up
and down a sidewalk; each time the two men passed the same store
window, they stopped and peered inside, then conferred with one
another before repeating the routine.87 This sequence of events led
the officer to conclude that the men were armed and preparing for “a
stick up.”88 The officer eventually engaged the men and frisked them
for weapons.89 The Supreme Court stated that the officer was justified
in believing the two men were “armed and thus presented a threat [or
danger] to the officer’s safety.”90 In Mimms, one of the first stop-andfrisk cases after Terry, an officer conducted a traffic stop to issue a
traffic summons for the driver’s expired license plate.91 Upon
approaching the car, he noticed a bulge in the individual’s jacket.92
Fearing that the bulge might have been a weapon, the officer
immediately conducted a frisk.93 The Court held that “[t]he bulge in
the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed

84. See id. at 700–02 (majority opinion).
85. See id. at 704–05 (Wynn, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 6–7.
90. Id. at 28. It is important to note, however, that the Court recognized that the
officer predicated his suspicion on the belief that the men were “contemplating a daylight
robbery—which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of
weapons.” Id.
91. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (per curiam).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the
officer.”94
The “thus” iteration is the foundation of the unitary concept
interpretation.95 The Robinson II majority concluded that the
Supreme Court’s use of “thus” expresses a deliberate choice to
combine the elements and recognize that an armed individual is
inherently dangerous.96 But this misinterprets and misapplies
Supreme Court precedent in several ways.
1. Ignoring Intentional Phrasing
First, the Robinson II majority neglected to give significant
meaning to the Supreme Court’s grammatical structure of armed and
dangerous. Clearly, there was no context offered by the Supreme
Court which reasonably warrants the belief that the “and” in “armed
and dangerous” is to be interpreted other than in its ordinary sense as
a conjunction,97 aside from the “thus” iterations mentioned in Terry
and Mimms.98 In support of the Robinson II majority, the
concurrence admitted that the “thus” iteration, at most, conflated the
elements into a unitary concept, but only for firearms.99
Concededly, the majority’s and concurrence’s reasoning is
compelling when applied to the regular armed and dangerous
iteration—the Supreme Court did not coincidentally use the “thus”
iterations. But, if there must be emphasis on the different iterations of
the standard, the majority dodged the fact that the standard has been
written a third way throughout the Supreme Court’s stop-and-frisk

94. Id. at 112.
95. Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
379 (2017) (mem.).
96. Id. (first citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968); and then citing Mimms, 434
U.S. at 112).
97. See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 58 (1930). Compare Meredith v. Pence, 984
N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ind. 2013) (“The framers [sic] use of the conjunction ‘and’ [in the
education clause of Indiana’s Constitution] plainly suggests that the phrases are separate
and distinct.”), with Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 454 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b)(5)) (analyzing Rule 60(b)(5)’s list of three disjunctive provisions for relief and
concluding that the use of “or” makes it clear that each provision is independently
sufficient to warrant relief).
98. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 700 (holding, albeit implicitly, that the addition of
“thus” in the armed and dangerous standard eliminates the ordinary use of “and” as a
conjunction separating two distinct elements).
99. Id. at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring) (explaining that reconciling the regular armed
and dangerous standard and the “thus” iteration in this way ensures two distinct meanings
and maintains the limitations on police that Terry first created).
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precedent.100 “Armed and presently dangerous” is the next most
notable alternative phrasing of the standard. In fact, the Court wrote
“and presently” as the first iteration of armed and dangerous in
Terry.101 Neither the elevated weight given by the majority to the
“thus” standard nor the concurrence’s limitation of the unitary
concept to firearms can be reconciled with the equally weighty armed
and presently dangerous iteration.
Breaking down the grammatical structure of the “and presently”
iteration shows how contradictory it is to the unitary concept. The
court used a conjunction to signify separation and distinction of the
two elements.102 If being armed were enough or, as the Fourth Circuit
contends, if being armed inherently embodied danger, the court could
have used it alone rather than form a standard that encompasses
meaningless surplusage.103 More to the point, the second element—
dangerous—is offset by a qualifier: “presently,” which serves as a
temporal constraint. This suggests that only danger in the moment is
sufficient to warrant reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk.104
Therefore, the officer is justified in conducting a frisk only by
100. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327–28 (2009) (applying the armed and
dangerous standard to a stop-and-frisk involving a suspected gang member); Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047–49 (1983) (using the “armed and dangerous” standard to justify
the search of a vehicle when the police have reason to suspect that the individual is
dangerous and possesses immediate access to a weapon); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
92–93 (1979) (stating that an officer could not justify the frisking of a bystander while
conducting a search warrant under the armed and dangerous standard); Mimms, 434 U.S.
at 112 (1977) (referencing the standard as both armed and presently dangerous and later
as “armed and thus pos[ing] a serious and present danger”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146–48 (1972) (holding that a police officer was justified in his frisking of an
individual based on a tip that said individual was carrying a firearm under the armed and
dangerous standard); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (stating that an officer is
justified in conducting a stop-and-frisk if he reasonably believes the individual is “armed
and presently dangerous”).
101. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (concluding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny
police some form of self-protective search power when an investigated individual is
“armed and presently dangerous”). Additionally, stop-and-frisk cases subsequent to Terry
regularly incorporate the “and presently” iteration of the standard. See, e.g., Ybarra, 444
U.S. at 92–93; Sophie J. Hart & Dennis M. Martin, Essay, Judge Gorsuch and the Fourth
Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 135–36 (2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/69-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-132.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZF-R27K]
(stating that most courts adhere to the “armed and presently dangerous” standard from
Terry).
102. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1221.
103. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting).
104. Since police rely on in-the-moment judgments to form a reasonable suspicion, it
logically follows that police can only draw on their perceptions. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30;
Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698.
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pointing to specific and articulable facts that the stopped individual is
not only carrying a weapon but is, at that moment, also dangerous.105
Of course, the plain-language argument can be configured in
support of the “thus” iteration, but this further proves my point: there
is no viable reconciliation in favor of the “thus” standard that could
not also go in favor of “presently,” and vice versa, if emphasis is put
on grammatical structure. At bottom, the conflicting iterations are
polar opposites that nullify each other, leaving just the regular armed
and dangerous standard. The unitary concept holding was
manufactured out of the two mere instances that the Supreme Court
used the “thus” iteration—out of seven other times the standard was
written a different way throughout Terry and Mimms106—in isolation
and without surrounding context.
2. Reading the Standard in Isolation
Extending the argument that the majority’s preferred iteration is
nullified by the equally available “and presently” standard, the “thus”
iteration’s support for a unitary concept fails for a second reason: the
majority ignored the interpretations of the frisk standard in cases
decided after Terry and Mimms. After Mimms—which applied Terry
to automobile drivers in a roadside setting107—Michigan v. Long
presented the question of whether officers could extend a protective
frisk for weapons during a roadside stop to the individual’s car.108 In
Long, the Court discussed how Terry’s scope has been narrowly
expanded over time to several new factual situations.109 Each
situation, the Court recognized, poses substantial risk and danger to
law enforcement,110 just like in Terry.111 Notwithstanding the new
factual situation in Long, the Court held, in part, that the inherent
danger in roadside stops “compel[s] our conclusion that the search of

105. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
106. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (per curiam) (articulating
the stop-and-frisk standard without using “thus” once); Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25, 27, 30
(stating the stop-and-frisk standard five times without using “thus”).
107. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109.
108. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1983) (“We did not, however,
expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area
beyond the person.”).
109. See id. at 1047–48.
110. See id. (establishing that the holdings of Pennsylvania v. Mimms and Adams v.
Williams were both based in part on the inherent danger in traffic stops).
111. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24 (discussing the immediate interest of law enforcement
to be able to assure their safety against America’s long history of armed violence).
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the passenger compartment . . . is permissible if the police officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts’
. . . that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons.”112
Ybarra v. Illinois113 presents another contradictory reading of the
armed and dangerous standard that the majority avoided.114 Ybarra
was an unfortunate bystander in the Aurora Tap Tavern during the
execution of a search warrant.115 The search warrant specifically and
particularly allowed the officers to search the tavern and the prime
suspect, a bartender at the tavern.116 However, law enforcement
conducted pat downs of every individual in the bar, including Ybarra
on two separate occasions.117 During the first pat down, the officer felt
a cigarette pack on Ybarra.118 It was not until Ybarra was frisked for
the second time that the officer removed the cigarette pack and found
heroin inside.119
Analyzing the case, the Court quickly rejected the State’s
contention that there was probable cause to search and remove the
cigarette pack.120 In the alternative, the State argued that the first pat
down was constitutionally permissible as a frisk for weapons under
Terry.121 The Court also rejected this argument because the frisk “was
simply not supported by a reasonable belief that [Ybarra] was armed
and presently dangerous.”122
Neither Long nor Ybarra dealt with firearms,123 which Judge
Wynn’s concurrence suggests is the linchpin that rightfully allows

112. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (conveying
two distinct elements that must be met for the stop-and-frisk to be legitimate).
113. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
114. See id. at 92–93.
115. Id. at 88.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 88–89. The officers announced that they would be conducting pat downs as a
“cursory search for weapons.” Id. at 88.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 88–89.
120. Id. at 91 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62–63 (1968)) (“[Ybarra’s] mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more,
give rise to probable cause to search [him] . . . [A] search or seizure of a person must be
supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”).
121. Id. at 92.
122. Id. at 92–93.
123. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1983) (involving an officer who saw a
knife on the defendant’s floorboard); Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88–89 (involving an officer who
found heroin on the defendant).
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conflating the frisk standard into a unitary concept.124 But Adams v.
Williams125 defeats that argument. In Adams, decided between Terry
and Mimms, the officer received a tip that a man was sitting in his car
with heroin and a gun.126 The officer approached the car, situated in a
high-crime area, tapped on the window, and asked the individual to
open the door.127 Instead, the individual rolled down the window, at
which point the officer reached into the car and removed the firearm
from the individual’s waistband.128 The gun carrier was subsequently
arrested for unlawful possession of a pistol.129
The frisked individual contested the reliability of the tip and,
most relevantly, argued that the officer’s actions were unreasonable
under Terry.130 Interestingly, although the case involved a firearm, the
majority never mentioned any iteration of the armed and dangerous
standard that included “thus” or “therefore.”131 Instead, the Court
used the “armed and presently dangerous” iteration.132 Moreover, the
Court pointed to several specific and articulable facts known to the
officer at the time that made the officer’s actions reasonable, without
referencing the unitary concept.133 Therefore, even when a firearm is
the product of a frisk, the Supreme Court did not apply the unitary
concept.
These cases show two things. First, every expansion of the stopand-frisk doctrine has retained the requirement that an officer
reasonably believe that the individual is armed and also dangerous—a
two-element test.134 Second, despite the concurrence’s insistence,
conflating the frisk standard when an officer is dealing with a firearm
124. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Wynn, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.).
125. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
126. Id. at 144–45.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 145.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 146 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)) (listing the standard only
twice and phrasing it as either armed and dangerous or armed and presently dangerous).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 147–48.
134. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (discussing the elements of
armed and dangerous separately when determining whether the search of a vehicle was
appropriate); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92–93 (1979) (addressing each element of the
armed and dangerous standard distinctly); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112
(1977) (per curiam) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22) (stating that a limited pat down is
reasonable when the officer reasonably concludes that the individual is armed and
presently dangerous).
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is invalid under Adams. Overall, the Robinson II majority plainly
read the “thus” iteration in isolation and without any surrounding
context, disregarding anything contrary to their preferred unitary
concept interpretation. Terry and its progeny show that the
conjunction in armed and dangerous was intentional and each
element must be distinctly satisfied to conduct a lawful frisk.
B.

Implications of Robinson II

As discussed above, the majority misinterpreted Terry and its
progeny,135 which led the court to hold that an individual is
presumptively dangerous when armed.136 Unfortunately, that is where
the majority opinion ends, with no discussion about the implications
of this landmark interpretation. Fortunately, both the concurring and
dissenting opinions explore the implications of this new
interpretation, providing a vivid picture of the potential
consequences. I will expand on these implications and provide my
own.
The dissent’s premise is based in the pervasiveness of state
legislation allowing concealed and open carry in our nation.137 Judge
Harris even stated that:
[F]or many years . . . concealed firearms were hallmarks of
criminal activity . . . carried by law-breakers to facilitate their
crimes. . . . But that is no longer the case . . . as behavior once
the province of law-breakers becomes commonplace and a
matter of legal right, we no longer may take for granted the
same correlation between “armed” and “dangerous.”138
What this means, then, is that law enforcement cannot view guns
through the same lens as they did before. Even if Terry and Mimms
are read as creating a unitary concept through the “thus” iterations,
both law enforcement and the courts must be prepared to adapt their
procedures to a nation where state laws permit open and concealed
carry and federal case law supports the constitutional right to bear
arms.139 If not, the following consequences may result.

135. See supra Section II.A.
136. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.).
137. See id. at 707–08 (Harris, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 707.
139. See id. at 707, 714 (discussing the proliferation of gun laws); see also United States
v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and

97 N.C. L. REV. 192 (2018)

210

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

1. No Barrier to Unbridled Police Discretion
The justification for adjudicating the constitutionality of stopand-frisk in Terry was to craft a “narrowly drawn authority to permit
a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer.”140 That justification plainly recognizes that “police officers
need discretion to perform their investigative duties” free from the
fear of a weapon being used against them.141 As a result, the Court set
up a two-pronged analysis in which a frisk seemingly enables police to
reach their desired end point; that is, a pat down allows the officer to
continue his investigation with protection from the use of a firearm
against himself.142 Simply considering the syntax of “stop-and-frisk”
and its real-world application, officers may not conduct a frisk
without (1) satisfying the stop standard, and (2) satisfying the frisk
standard.143 It is reasonable to conclude that this was the standard the
Terry Court intended.
Although a Fourth Amendment violation during the stop portion
involves a fundamental abuse of the “privacy and security of
individuals,”144 this abuse is compounded by the effects of a resulting
frisk. To be sure, a frisk is a highly intrusive search, even though it
does not reach the magnitude of a full-blown search.145 The Terry
Court vividly described the intrusive nature of the procedure and
concluded that it has the potential to embarrass and create
“community resentment,” and therefore is “not to be undertaken
lightly.”146 It follows, therefore, that everything preceding a frisk is
concurring in the judgment) (discussing the need for law enforcement and courts to
“evaluate [their] thinking” on Fourth Amendment issues in light of gun rights).
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
141. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
1).
142. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (concluding that, after a thorough evaluation of the
countervailing arguments, “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer”—indicating clear
emphasis on creating a new extension of the Fourth Amendment that allows a search for
weapons). Relatedly, in explaining his agreement with the reasonable suspicion standard
crafted by the majority, Justice Harlan stated that the prevailing question generated by
stop-and-frisk cases, including Terry, is whether the “evidence produced by a frisk is
admissible.” Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Because this is the
prevailing question, he stated that the problem is the determination of “what makes a frisk
reasonable.” Id. Justice Harlan is impliedly observing that the frisk and anything coming
from it is the critical part of the doctrine. See id.
143. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009).
144. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
145. See id. at 16–17.
146. Id. at 17 n.14.
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meant to constructively serve as a barrier—when the barriers are not
sufficiently hurdled, the concluding frisk must be invalidated. But,
with the Fourth Circuit’s implementation of the unitary concept, the
“dangerous” inquiry is rendered obsolete. This leaves only the stop
standard and whether an individual is armed, or simply reasonably
believed to be armed, as the last barriers to a frisk.147 Several courts—
including the Fourth Circuit—and commentators believe these are
the only true barriers to a frisk,148 but the Supreme Court has never
held that knowledge that an individual is armed was sufficient, on its
own, to effectuate a frisk.149 But neither the stop standard nor the
armed requirement meaningfully serve as a hurdle without the
“dangerous” inquiry; thus, there are essentially no barriers to
unbridled police discretion to frisk.

147. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 712 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting)
(reciting the government’s argument that the court “need not worry about these possible
disproportionate effects because a Terry frisk may be conducted only after a stop on
reasonable suspicion,” which prevents stops based on hunches), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379
(2017) (mem.).
148. See, e.g., id. at 700 (majority opinion); United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481,
491 (10th Cir. 2013); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1167.
149. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (explaining that the
circumstances allow a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile if the officer
reasonably believes that the suspect “is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons,” thus showing a clear demarcation between the armed and the
dangerous elements); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92–93 (1979) (rejecting the State’s
argument that the first frisk of Ybarra was permissible under Terry because the officer
conducted the frisk without a reasonable belief that Ybarra was armed and presently
dangerous, the predicate to conducting a frisk); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (concluding that the
most important part of an officer’s ability to effectuate a reasonable search for weapons is
not “absolute[] certain[ty] that the individual is armed” but whether the officer “belie[ves]
that his safety or that of others [is] in danger”); see also Northrup v. City of Toledo Police
Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that armed is separate and distinct
from dangerous). Even in the time period alluded to by Judge Harris—several years after
the inception of the stop-and-frisk doctrine when concealed firearms were hallmarks of
criminal activity—there had to be further evidence to frisk, because armed was insufficient
on its own. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 707–08 (Harris, J., dissenting). The officer in Terry, for
example, used his extensive knowledge of the area and many years of experience,
knowledge of the crimes perpetrated there, and his extended observation of the suspects
to provide facts that met the reasonable belief that the suspects were planning a daylight
robbery, which was the present danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6, 28. Nevertheless, courts
have concluded that reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed can meet the
standard to conduct a lawful stop, especially when carrying a firearm is illegal in the
jurisdiction. See Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 483, 486–87 (holding as reasonable a stop-and-frisk
where an officer observed a handgun in the waistband of the suspect’s pants in a state
where concealed carry is illegal); Bellin, supra note 7, at 31 (“The weapon, once detected,
is suspected contraband, and contraband can be seized upon detection.” (citing Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993))).
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For the stop portion, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion
that a crime or other infraction has been or is being committed.150
Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard.151 In practice, and
specifically in Robinson II, the objectivity of reasonable suspicion is
easily evaded,152 devolving into a mere smokescreen of protection.153
A police officer stopped Robinson because of a seatbelt violation, a
lawful pretext,154 to further investigate a tip by an unidentified caller
as to a concealed handgun.155 No Fourth Circuit judge found this
segment of the case problematic, because the law surrounding
pretextual stops is settled. Notably though, the police officer may be
incorrect about the armed status of an individual and still satisfy the
armed inquiry of the frisk standard once the stop is completed.156
In light of state legislation allowing concealed and open carry
and the expanding scope of Second Amendment rights,157 being
armed is largely a lawful act that should no longer carry a negative
connotation.158 But under the unitary concept, an individual merely
suspected to be armed who has only committed a seatbelt violation,
or any other minor infraction, is now subject to a “lawful” invasion of

150. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009).
151. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22 (explaining that a court assesses the reasonableness of a
search and seizure based on the objective standard of what facts were available to the
officer at the moment of the search or seizure); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the
subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.” (quoting
United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000))).
152. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 712 (Harris, J., dissenting).
153. Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 146 (1996) (asserting that a police officer’s
traffic violation stop can provide a lawful pretext to serve as a smokescreen to disguise the
officer’s true motives).
154. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–12 (1996) (holding that the Court is
unwilling to entertain challenges to the Fourth Amendment based on subjectivity or
pretext, so long as the pretext is not predicated on an impermissible discriminatory basis).
155. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 695.
156. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1977) (per curiam); Terry,
392 U.S. at 27.
157. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
158. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379
(2017) (mem.); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); see, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-269 (2017) (authorizing concealed carry with a permit); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-287.4 (Supp. 2018) (restricting certain types of carry); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-4
(Westlaw through 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.) (authorizing concealed carry with a
permit). But see United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 483, 486–87 (10th Cir. 2013)
(referencing the New Mexico criminal statute that made carrying a concealed firearm
anywhere illegal).
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his or her sanctity.159 With the elimination of “dangerous,” the stop
standard and the armed inquiry prove to be no more than ineffective
barriers of Fourth Amendment protection.
Police now have unbridled discretion to intrude upon citizens
availing themselves of his or her state’s permissive gun laws.160
Moreover, citizens now have no recourse to compel a distinct showing
of dangerousness.161 Even worse is the potential for law enforcement
to disproportionately use this discretion in certain areas and against
certain people.162 Before the unitary concept interpretation, stop-andfrisk had already provoked a longstanding debate surrounding race,
police violence, and harassment.163 It has been recognized that the
racial implications of upholding the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk
were squarely before the Terry Court, whether in the form of an
amicus brief164 or the national incidents leading up to the disposition
of the case.165 In fact, the Terry Court admitted that it had at least

159. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 712 (Harris, J., dissenting) (reasoning that police can
target whomever they please for an exploratory frisk—whether or not they know the
individual is armed—if they watch them long enough to spot a moving violation).
160. See Devon W. Carbado & L. Song Richardson, The Black Police: Policing our
Own, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1979, 2016 (2018) (explaining that reasonable suspicion, even
without the unitary concept interpretation, is a low bar that gives police “tremendous
discretion with respect to deciding whom to subject to stop and frisks”).
161. See, e.g., Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 700 (“In this case, both requirements—a lawful
stop and a reasonable suspicion that Robinson was armed—were satisfied, thus justifying
[the officer’s] frisk under the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law.”); Rodriguez, 739
F.3d at 491 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer “had no reason to believe
he was dangerous” merely because he was armed—being armed justified the
reasonableness of the frisk). It is noteworthy to add that Justice Harlan’s oft-cited
statement that “the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic” after a reasonable
stop has been conducted does not apply in Robinson II. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan,
J., concurring). This is because the aforementioned statement is part of a larger
conditional statement—the right to an immediate and automatic frisk is only present “if
the reason for the stop is . . . an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.” Id. This was
not the case in Robinson II. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 697.
162. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 711–12 (Harris, J., dissenting).
163. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio’s
Pathway to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1516 (2017) (listing several factors
spanning from protestations by African American leaders and race riots to President
Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that
all converged to make it clear that the Supreme Court was going to handle a stop-and-frisk
case in the sixties).
164. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund submitted an amicus brief in Terry, arguing
that stop-and-frisk “power is employed by the police most frequently against the
inhabitants of our inner cities, racial minorities and the underprivileged.” Id. at 1527–28.
165. See id. at 1528–30 (discussing events from the civil rights movement in years
preceding Terry).
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contemplated the racial implications of stop-and-frisk.166 Accordingly,
law professor Devon Carbado has argued that Terry, for multiple
reasons, “enables police violence against African Americans,”
thereby making it a central part of the debate about race, police
violence, and harassment from the 1960s to today.167
Fast forward to 2013, and the prescient protestations of several
advocacy groups before the disposition of Terry came to fruition just
as they warned. In the groundbreaking case of Floyd v. City of New
York,168 a federal court found that New York Police Department
“officers [were] directed, sometimes expressly, to target certain
defined groups for stops.”169 And more broadly, within the last six
years at least, the multitude of black men and women killed by law
enforcement has spurred the debate surrounding race, police
violence, and harassment to new heights, resulting in an ever-present
tension between communities of color and police.170 Combining the
predictions of aggravated racial implications, evidence of
discriminatory employment of stop-and-frisk, and the interrelated
resurgence of tension between communities of color and police, the
unitary concept interpretation only exacerbates the problem.
Disproportionate and discriminatory application of frisks can flourish,
with no recourse in compelling a distinct showing of dangerousness,
because the unitary concept interpretation openly invites unbridled
police discretion.

166. When describing the procedure for a frisk and the backlash against police that can
result from it, the Court noted that the exclusionary rule—the prevailing and resulting
remedy when deciding a Fourth Amendment case—cannot control whether a frisk can
abate this tension. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15, 15 n.11, 17 n.14; Carbado, supra note 163,
at 1532–33 (explaining Chief Justice Warren’s argument that the exclusionary rule, as a
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, is ill-equipped to deter alleged wholesale
harassment by police against African Americans).
167. Carbado, supra note 163, at 1510, 1512 (emphasis added).
168. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
169. Id. at 660; see also Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk
Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-andfrisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/SD8L-CBSQ (dark-archive)]
(“Judge Scheindlin found[] the stops overwhelmingly involved minority men because
police commanders had come to see them as ‘the right people’ to stop.”). See Carbado,
supra note 163, at 1537–40, for an in-depth discussion of the Floyd litigation and the
NYPD’s employment of stop-and-frisk as a racial profiling prophylactic.
170. See Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of
Black Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory.html#
2016 [http://perma.cc/7GGM-P8AE] (profiling the cases of black men and women who
died after a police encounter).
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2. Dismantling Terry’s Narrow Scope Within the Fourth Amendment
The unitary concept dismantles the narrow scope of the stopand-frisk doctrine.171 Terry represents the beginning sketches of a
wholly new parameter to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme
Court was aware of the magnitude that the newly-minted
constitutional doctrine would carry172—the opinion signaled to lower
courts and law enforcement the conduct that the Court approved as
“comporting with constitutional guarantees,” as well as the conduct
that would be sanctioned as impermissible for years to come.173 To
that end, the Court attempted to carefully craft the doctrine as a
narrow exception to both the probable cause standard and general
adherence to the warrant requirement.174 After Terry, moreover, the
Court sought to maintain the doctrine’s narrow scope while
developing the doctrine through new factual situations.175
171. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 707 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the unitary concept because it is “a rule that . . . open[s] the door to the very
abuses the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017)
(mem.); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Being a felon in
possession of a firearm is not the default status. More importantly, where a state permits
individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, cannot justify
an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification would dismantle Fourth
Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states.”).
172. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 127 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Cognizant that such intrusion had never before received
constitutional imprimatur on less than probable cause . . . we reflected upon the magnitude
of the departure we were endorsing.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1968)
(recognizing the competing arguments in favor and against giving stop-and-frisk practices
constitutional support as well as the magnitude of the liberties at issue in Fourth
Amendment cases).
173. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. The Court further stated that as the doctrine is incorporated
into the “judicial process of inclusion and exclusion” of evidentiary rulings, the way a
court rules will have the effect of either legitimizing or delegitimizing the conduct. Id.
Last, in the opening paragraph of Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, he stated that he
was “constrained to fill in a few gaps . . . because what is said by this Court today will serve
as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this
important new field of law develops.” Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
174. See id. at 20 (majority opinion) (“Instead [of being subject to the warrant
procedure or probable cause], the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the
Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”);
see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208–10 (1979) (discussing the inception of
the stop-and-frisk doctrine and how the Supreme Court established a “narrowly drawn”
and “narrowly defined” doctrine in its departure from probable cause; as well as how the
Court has “been careful to maintain [Terry’s] narrow scope” throughout subsequent
cases); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (emphasizing the Court’s “narrow” view of
Terry’s exception to the probable cause requirement).
175. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam).
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Robinson II did not present a new fact pattern warranting the
expansion or restriction of the doctrine.176 Instead, the fact pattern
came on the cusp of a transition of norms surrounding handguns,
which challenged the underpinnings of stop-and-frisk. In essence,
Shaquille Robinson argued to reaffirm the logical conclusion of Terry
and its progeny as it pertains to frisks: dangerous is distinct and
separate from armed, and requires specific and articulable facts
before a frisk can be conducted.177 In other words, the Robinson II
majority faced the ancillary question of whether there is permissible
conduct that falls in the category of armed but not dangerous.
Indeed, this holding could have embraced the narrow reach of
stop-and-frisk.178 However, the majority elected to interpret the frisk
standard as a unitary concept. The dangerousness of roadside stops
and, most importantly, firearms (although both are legitimate)
outweighed the potential for unbridled police discretion to intrude
upon citizens’ liberty and security.179 It follows, therefore, that the
scope of the doctrine has expanded beyond what the Court originally
intended. In fact, in his concurring opinion in Terry—lauded for its
prescient insight on several matters that would encapsulate the future
development of the doctrine180—Justice Harlan further clarified what
makes a frisk reasonable under Fourth Amendment protections by
“fill[ing] in a few gaps” in the majority opinion.181 Specifically, he
made it clear that the constitutionality of the frisk did not rest on the
officer’s authority to protect himself and others from dangerous
weapons—that is, the fact that Terry and Chilton were carrying
concealed guns was not the reason why the frisk was upheld.182
Instead, the majority in Terry affirmed the frisk because of the
officer’s right to frisk when “confronting a possibly hostile person.”183
Thus, both Justice Harlan and the majority clearly contemplated the
176. See supra Section II.A.2, for a discussion of post-Terry cases that involved new
factual situations but did not stray from Terry’s core tenets.
177. See supra Section II.A.
178. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck
in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search . . . .”).
179. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[A]n officer who
makes a lawful traffic stop and who has a reasonable suspicion that one of the
automobile’s occupants is armed may frisk that individual for the officer’s protection and
the safety of everyone on the scene.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.).
180. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1177.
181. Terry, 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 31–32.
183. Id. at 32.
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use of a frisk when a person is dangerous (i.e., hostile). Therefore, the
elimination of a key inquiry in the frisk standard—the “dangerous”
inquiry—dismantles the basis of Terry frisks.
III. THE SOLUTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT
For the reasons discussed in Part II, the Robinson II unitary
concept interpretation is a misinterpretation of stop-and-frisk
precedent that invites unbridled police discretion to frisk, and
ultimately dismantles the basis of Terry frisks. Surprisingly, the
Fourth Circuit is not the only federal appellate court to interpret the
frisk standard as a unitary concept.184 On the other hand, the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits have rejected a unitary concept interpretation.185
Though some scholars characterize circuit splits as trivial and
overstated,186 others have reached the opposite conclusion,
specifically in the Fourth Amendment context, based on the
perceived need for uniformity (which fosters public faith and
legitimacy in the Supreme Court) and the Court’s core responsibility
to clarify the meaning of rights.187
The Supreme Court should clarify whether the frisk standard is a
unitary concept or encompasses two separate inquiries. The Supreme
Court forever changed the national debate surrounding gun policy
with Heller and McDonald.188 Although there is no indication of
direct causation, those two cases might have been the impetus for the
torrent of state legislation permitting concealed and open carry. The
Court perhaps affected a shift in the public’s perception toward guns,
which were once deemed presumptively dangerous but are now
authorized by law.189 Therefore, the Court can no longer sit on its
184. See United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 491 (10th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally Wilkins, supra note 13, for a
discussion of why conflating the frisk standard into a unitary concept is the correct way for
courts to read the armed and dangerous standard.
185. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
186. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1139–40 (2012).
187. Id. at 1173–74.
188. The Heller Decision and What It Means, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/the-second-amendment/the-supreme-courtthe-second-amendment/dc-v-heller/ [http://perma.cc/DLZ8-NYB9] (“[T]he ruling in Heller
represented a dramatic reversal of the Court’s previous interpretation of the Second
Amendment.”).
189. See Bellin, supra note 7, at 31 (explaining that meeting the dangerousness element
in armed and dangerous by implying danger from a firearm is “hardly a foregone
conclusion” because of Terry’s requirement of specific and articulable facts to justify a
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hands while the basis of Terry frisk doctrine is dismantled and
rendered inconclusive—it must act to remedy the apparent
misinterpretation and inevitable implications of the unitary concept
interpretation.
The Court has already abdicated its role of clarification once by
failing to grant certiorari for Robinson II.190 However, Robinson II
may present facts—concealing a firearm in a high-crime area—that
summarily disqualify certain Supreme Court Justices from reversing
the unitary concept, no matter how contrary it is to Terry and its
progeny. As much as invalidating unconstitutional conduct matters,
so does presenting the Court with the right set of facts to do so.
Preliminarily, the Justices must agree that dangerous is a
separate, distinct, and necessary element of the frisk standard, but
ultimately, they must also agree that the facts of the case in front of
them allow them to safely recognize and rule that the person’s
conduct falls in the category of armed but not dangerous. Robinson
II’s facts would be a toss-up if not disqualifying. But what about an
African American bank manager who lawfully owns and carries a
firearm, who was stopped and frisked simply because he carried a gun
and looked out of place in an affluent, predominantly white
neighborhood; or a plain-clothes, off-duty police officer carrying his
gun in a high crime area who is stopped and frisked when pulled over
by a colleague? If we assume there is no hint of danger or hostility in
either of the hypothetical examples, just like in Robinson II,191 the
Court is put in a conundrum that should end clearly in favor of
invalidating the unitary concept.
To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court should take the
next opportunity to grant certiorari in a Terry stop-and-frisk case. The
solution lies in the reasoning of Judge Harris’s dissent192 and the clear
frisk); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1169, 1170–71 (recognizing that before Heller, carrying a
weapon could be presumed to be an unlawful act that could elicit a stop and came with a
blanket assumption that the person was dangerous, allowing a frisk; however, the Heller
decision changed whether being armed was presumptively unlawful and dangerous).
190. Robinson v. United States, 38 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.) (denying Robinson’s
petition for writ of certiorari).
191. Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[H]e was compliant,
cooperative, [and] not displaying signs of nervousness.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017)
(mem.); Robinson I, 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (highlighting that the arresting
officers indicated that Robinson was cooperative and made no movements that might have
suggested that he intended to reach for his weapon during the stop), rev’d en banc, 846
F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.).
192. See generally supra Section II.B, for a discussion of the Robinson II dissenters’
arguments and their relevance to past and future stop-and-frisk cases.
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parameters of the frisk standard proclaimed by Terry and its
progeny,193 alongside the right set of facts. Using the correct
interpretation and application of Terry and its progeny and the
evolution of gun norms through a nationwide shift in legislation, the
Supreme Court has the tools to effectively reverse Robinson II and all
cases with similar holdings.
CONCLUSION
The armed and dangerous standard is in need of repair after the
Robinson II majority’s unitary concept interpretation. The assertion
that being armed alone satisfies the frisk standard is a
misinterpretation, contrary to Terry and its progeny’s clear separation
and distinction between armed and dangerous.194 The consequences
that will abound from this holding are lengthy and profound.195 The
holding will forever brand those who avail themselves of permissive
concealed or open carry state laws as the subjects of unbridled police
discretion, and it doesn’t stop there.196 The Supreme Court should
grant certiorari in a Terry frisk case involving a gun and give the
lower courts clear guidance as to the unconstitutionality of a unitary
concept interpretation and the importance of a separate showing of
dangerousness in the frisk standard.
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